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  ABSTRACT  
A phishing attack is one of the most significant problems faced by online users be-
cause of its enormous effect on the online activities performed. In recent years, 
phishing attacks continue to escalate in frequency, severity and impact.  Several 
solutions, using various methodologies, have been proposed in the literature to 
counter the web-phishing threats. Notwithstanding, the existing technology cannot 
detect the new phishing attacks accurately due to the insufficient integration of fea-
tures of the text, image and frame in the evaluation process. The use of related 
features of images, frames and text of legitimate and non-legitimate websites and 
associated artificial intelligence algorithms to develop an integrated method to ad-
dress these together. This paper presents an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference Sys-
tem (ANFIS) based robust scheme using the integrated features of the text, images 
and frames for web-phishing detection and protection. The proposed solution 
achieves 98.3% accuracies. To our best knowledge, this is the first work that 
considers the best-integrated text, image and frame feature based solution for 
phishing detection scheme.    
 
1. Introduction  
Phishing is a form of social engineering attack in which an attacker 
attempts to fraudulently retrieve sensitive user information by 
sending an email claiming to be a legitimately established 
organisation. They scam the user into giving confidential 
information that could be used for identity theft (Arachchilage et 
al., 2016, Jakobsson and Myers, 2006). Commercial institutions 
and their end-users are regularly exposed to the threat of phish-
ing attacks (Barraclough et al., 2013). The danger is continuing to 
grow due to an increase in deception, impersonation, fraud and 
multiple online attacks. Most attacks are delivered by an email 
luring users to click a link embedded in the email that takes them 
to a malicious website. The attackers usually target end-users’ 
                                                          
1   APWG report [Online] Available at: https://docs.apwg.org/re-
ports/apwg_trends_report_q4_2017.pdf [Access 31 march 2018] 
financial information by claiming to be their bank, a utility 
company, HM Revenue and Customs or other government 
agencies to persuade the end-user to open the document 
attached to the email, which then targets sensitive information 
on their system (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The main 
reason why phishing attacks are still successful is the lack of 
awareness and computer literacy among Internet users mostly 
with regards to Internet safety (Deshmukh et al., 2017). 
According to a report by the Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(APWG)1, the total number of phishing websites observed in the 
fourth quarter of 2017 was 296,208. The most targeted sector is 
the payment service with 41.99 percent of phishing attacks, fol-
lowed by software-as-a-service (SaaS)/webmail with 17.07 
percent and financial institution with 15.48 percent (APWG, 
2017). 
   Currently, the increase in the use of computer devices such as 
smartphones and tablets for accessing information on the Inter-
net has more significance in financial crimes both regarding direct 
and indirect attacks (Fatt et al., 2014). That is to say, robbing a 
bank has changed into deceiving Internet banking users by steal-
ing their identities and fraudulently using them to gain access to 
their Internet banking account and take their money (Moghimi 
and Varjani, 2016). According to a Financial Fraud Action 2  UK 
report for 2017, about £165 million lost to fraud related to 
Internet payment cards, remote banking and identity theft in 
2017, and while this is 3.68% lower than the same period in 2016 
(Financial Fraud Action, 2017). There is still a need to do more to 
protect Internet users from phishers who want to steal their 
confidential information for financial gain (Khadir, 2015). 
   Addressing this situation, Barraclough et al. (2013) proposed a 
robust model using neuro-fuzzy with few inputs. This model 
employs fuzzy logic in combination with a neural network. The 
purpose of using neuro-fuzzy is that it has universal approxima-
tion and the ability to use fuzzy if…then rules. Fuzzy logic 
performs well when dealing with the reasoning in high-level 
language information while neuro-fuzzy does well when dealing 
with raw data (Barraclough et al., 2013). Fuzzy logic is used to 
provide a mode of qualitative reasoning, which is closer to human 
decision making because it handles fuzziness and ambiguity by 
combining fuzzy fact and fuzzy relations. Hence, a neuro-fuzzy im-
plementation helps a system to encode both unstructured and 
structured knowledge, while fuzzy rules enable the system to 
learn from examples (Stathacopoulou et al., 2005). 
   In this paper, a scheme that uses an intelligent ANFIS algorithm 
with a knowledge model and one input is proposed. The ANFIS is 
a network structure method that facilitates systematic computa-
tion of gradient vectors, it combines the least-squares and the 
gradient descent methods, and it utilises a useful fusion learning 
technique to derive the output error (Çakıt and Karwowski, 2016). 
ANFIS is a model that uses various features inputs selection, and 
                                                          
2   Financial Fraud Action UK [Online] Available at: < https://www.finan-
cialfraudaction.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2017-half-year-
fraud-update_September-17.pdf> [Access 15 December 2017] 
it trains the data with the least-squares application (Jang, 1996). 
The proposed intelligent system will combine a neural network 
and fuzzy logic (Arachchilage et al., 2016) with the capability of 
reasoning and learning through the knowledge model and exter-
nal knowledge sources. This technique was chosen because it al-
lows data learning by using the connectionist approach for com-
putation, and therefore the exact rules are from the fuzzy infer-
ence point of view (Barraclough et al., 2013). The method in this 
study uses a table in which the features or data of a valid website 
are stored for reference purposes. The data will includes website 
images, text and frames features. A total of 35 features are ex-
tracted to model the ANFIS; 22 elements represent the structure 
of the text-based properties, eight features represent the frame-
based properties, and five elements constitute the image-based 
resources of the website. The focus of the proposed intelligent 
phishing detection and protection scheme is to hinder website-
based phishing attacks that aim to entice victims into giving out 
their confidential and sensitive information.  
   The main contributions of this study are the use of hybrid 
website features such as frames, images and text to improve on 
previous works (Barraclough et al., 2013) based on text only. 
Hence, building a robust and thus accurate and vigorous classifier 
for intelligent phishing detection in online transactions using 
website properties to analyse and detect phishing. This study is 
significant because the proposed system will enable online users 
to have confidence in performing their web activities with peace 
of mind.   The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: sec-
tion 2 presents a review of the literature and related works. Sec-
tion 3 describes the proposed intelligent system with the hybrid 
feature. Section 4 explains the extraction and analysis of website 
features. Section 5 covers the experimental procedure. Section 6 
discusses the training and testing results. Section 7 concludes the 
paper by explaining this study’s contribution to knowledge and 
outlining future work. 
2. Literature review and related work 
2.1 Literature review  
Phishing is a type of online fraud in which a scammer uses a 
website or email to dishonestly obtain confidential information 
such as credit card details and Internet banking passwords 
(Martin et al., 2011). Phishing websites constitute a severe prob-
lem due to the enormous effect on the financial and online retail 
sectors. Due to the recent advances in technology, various 
procedures can now be used in phishing attacks that enable 
attackers to masquerade as a legitimate entity. Hence, they trick 
users into entering their credentials, such as passwords, 
username and credit card details into a fake web page for the 
attackers’ malicious use (Babu et al., 2010). Therefore, it is vital 
to prevent such attacks and defend against website phishing at-
tacks (Aburrous et al., 2008). Khadir and Sony (2015) reviewed 
different kinds of phishing detection techniques mainly focusing 
on linguistic techniques and machine learning technology in a 
study that covered works up to 2015. Their review highlighted 
that various anti-phishing toolbars had been developed to pro-
tect Internet users. One such example is the eBay toolbar that 
helps users to monitor the web pages the users visit and provides 
warnings in the form of a coloured tab on the toolbar (eBay, 
2016). Another is SpoofGuard, a plug-in developed for Internet 
Explorer, which examines the web pages users visit and warns 
them as to whether a particular page is likely to be a spoofed site 
(Neil Chou, 2004, Barraclough et al., 2013).  
   The use of non-executable files such as Microsoft Office and 
Adobe PDF documents attached to an email has been a 
component of many recent phishing attacks (Liao, 2008). Due to 
the failure of the filtering process of most email servers, anti-
spam software and Internet mail clients, this type of attack has 
grown in popularity. Most email servers filter out any executable 
file attached to an email because of the risk they pose, but non-
executable data can flow through and are considered safe by 
most users. Regrettably, a non-executable file constitutes a vul-
nerability that when exploited might allow a phisher to perform 
malicious actions on a victim’s computer (Cohen et al., 2016). 
2.2 Content-based approaches:  
Aburrous et al. (2010a) propose a model based on fuzzy logic 
combined with a data-mining algorithm to characterise the e-
banking phishing website. Their model indicates the worse e-
banking phishing site rate of 83.7% e-banking phishing website. 
However, the feature set that needs to be more comprehensive 
because it is based on text only to detect the phishing of e-bank-
ing websites. As the number of features is based on text only, the 
process needs to include more web page features such as images 
and frames for identifying e-banking phishing sites to improve 
accuracy. 
   Likewise, Aburrous et al. (2010b) implement an intelligent and 
efficient model based on an association classification data-mining 
algorithm. This algorithm is used to identify rules and factors, to 
classify the phishing website and the relationship that correlates 
the elements and standards together. They implement six differ-
ent techniques to extract text features from 120 sites to classify 
their legitimacy. The performance of each method is compared 
based on speed and accuracy. They demonstrate the feasibility of 
using each classification method in real applications involving 
large datasets and achieved better performance as compared to 
other traditional classification algorithms with an error rate of 
12.62%. Nevertheless, they are unable to use different pruning 
techniques that remove the rules with the incorrect classification, 
which reduces the accuracy rate of the proposed method. 
     Barraclough et al. (2013) propose a neuro-fuzzy system with 
fuzzy rules to differentiate between suspicious, phishing and le-
gitimate websites in real time. Their result shows higher accuracy 
with 2-fold cross-validation of 98.5% for real positives and 1.5% 
for false positives. This approach demonstrates the effectiveness 
of the neuro-fuzzy system when using five inputs for detecting 
phishing websites with higher accuracy in real time. Their com-
parison mechanism is better compared to another study because 
of its improved efficiency. However, the proposed technique only 
uses text-based features and could be improved if more features 
were added and the parameters were optimised for more 
precision. These observations will form the basis of our proposed 
intelligent phishing detecting scheme. 
   Furthermore, Barraclough et al. (2015) develop an online 
toolbar that continuously runs in the background of the Internet 
Explorer web browser checking all the websites the user requests 
against a set of data in real time. Their approach uses a neuro-
fuzzy scheme with six inputs: good site rules, user behaviour pro-
file, PhishTank, user-specific sites, pop-up windows, and user cre-
dential profile for detecting phishing web pages. Their result re-
flects improvement in phishing detection in real time. However, 
they concentrate only on text-based features. Therefore, their 
work could be expanded further by analysing frames and image 
features to achieve better accuracy. The toolbar is developed us-
ing 300 full features based on six sets of inputs. This data is fed 
into the feature extractor algorithm based on neuro-fuzzy. The 
toolbar compares web page requests against elements and 
copies the website if a suspicious site is detected, and a text di-
rective is generated in a red colour to alert the user. In testing, 
the solution achieves a 96% true positive rate and 4% false posi-
tive rate. The result is compared with the results of other work 
such as SpoofGaurd, Netcraft, EarthLink, Google, Cloudmark, In-
ternet Explorer 8, TrustWatch and McAfee. The toolbar outper-
forms these regarding accuracy in real time. The main contribu-
tion of their study is the introduction of a novel voice-generated 
user warning interface algorithm for toolbar detection; this 
method will be integrated into our system implementation. 
    Barraclough and Sexton (2015) utilise six input data sources 
based on neuro-fuzzy and extract 300 features to train and test a 
fuzzy inference system with 2-fold cross-validation. The rationale 
for using a feature-based approach is to find useful features to 
generate fuzzy rules and classify legitimate, phishing and suspi-
cious websites. The overall accuracy of their method is improved, 
and it outperforms other machine learning algorithms 
(Barraclough and Sexton, 2015). However, they use only text-
based features, so this method could be improved by including 
frame and image features for more robust analysis and accuracy. 
2.3 Visual similarity approaches:   
 Wenyin et al. (2005) develop a solution based on the visual 
similarity between two web pages. They measure four metrics in 
their plan; web page layout, frame, block level, and overall style 
similarity. The block level similarity measures the visual similarity 
of two web pages and calculates the similarity in the feature set 
using the weighted sum of the individual similarity as the total 
sum of the two blocks. Hence, they focus on the visual style of the 
web page, including features such as fonts, background colour, 
line spacing and text alignment. They collect these features and 
calculate the normalised correlation coefficient of the two web 
pages’ histograms. Even with this promising solution, more 
features and thorough testing are required for a more 
comprehensive result.  
      In a similar vein, Fu et al. (2006), Chen et al. (2010) and Zhang 
et al. (2011) use an earth mover’s distance (EMD) algorithm to 
train a threshold vector for classifying a web page as legitimate 
or phishing. They measure the web page visual similarity by using 
EMD in their calculation. The EMD is used to calculate the signa-
ture distances of the images of the Internet pages. They demon-
strate the advantage of their method by comparing it with region 
matching and HTML/DOM-based visual similarity methods for 
phishing detection. However, even with the use of EMD, the so-
lution cannot detect a web page that does not have visual simi-
larity. Therefore, there is a need to include more features to im-
prove detection performance. 
   A scheme is also proposed by Dunlop et al. (2010), called 
GoldPhish, which provides zero-day protection against phishing 
attacks with high precision. However, the scrutiny time in this 
scheme is quite high. The approach uses a browser plug-in to 
detect and report phishing sites that use optical character 
recognition (OCR) to read the text from an image of the web page, 
and that grabs the top-ranked domains from a search engine. The 
solution captures the current web page in which the user is surf-
ing as an image and use OCR techniques to convert the picture 
into readable text. Hence, the texts are collect and input into a 
search engine to retrieve page ranking results. Their application 
compares the top-level and second-level domain of the web page 
the user is visiting with the first four in the Google search engine 
results. When a match found, the application can verify the site 
and notify the user via the GoldPhish toolbar about the legitimacy 
of the website. In testing, the solution achieves 98% true positive 
and 2% false positive rates on over 100 sites. However, this 
method is unstable such that the image could be manipulated 
with little variation causing the process to fail regarding accuracy. 
Their solution is better than the previous image comparison 
method that relies on a database. Nevertheless, more 
comprehensive testing needs to be carried out because 100 sites 
are little compared to the number of phishing sites that appear 
every day. 
   Kumar and Kumar (2015) develop an anti-phishing solution 
based on a visual cryptography approach. In their method, the 
user generates two shares of images using a (2, 2) visual cryptog-
raphy scheme. The first time that the user registers on a website, 
the user stores the first share of the image, and the other part is 
uploaded to the site. During each login attempt, the user must 
verify the legitimacy of the location by comparing the image of 
both shares (Kumar and Kumar, 2015). However, their test result 
is not robust due to the low number of websites used in the test 
experiment, so there is a need to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis to improve precision. 
   Likewise, Chou et al. (2004) developed a plug-in called 
SpoofGuard. SpoofGuard is an Internet Explorer browser plug-in. 
The plug-in accesses the Internet Explorer history files and uses 
three additional types of data stored in the user’s profile direc-
tory. One of the records is a read-only file such as Hotmail and 
Yahoo Mail. The other two documents are the hash password and 
hash image history. This data is used by the plug-in to verify the 
authenticity of the web page. However, the toolbar plug-in 
solution specifically developed to reduce phishing attacks. The 
plug-in is symptom-based in that it looks for a phishing indicator, 
such as masked links, on the website and the similar domain 
name that the user visits. Their model with the password checks 
is critical to the strength of their solution. The image checker hash 
algorithm needs improvement to be able to detect small modifi-
cations to images. Alerts are generated based on the number of 
signs identified.  
   Similarly, Fatt et al. (2014) propose an approach that is based 
on the website favicon to check the identity of a site with the use 
of the Google search-by-image API search engine solution and use 
its result to evaluate the genuineness of a website. They use 
Google search-by-image, which is a content-based image re-
trieval technique for querying and get a list of information related 
to an image. The favicon is a website shortcut icon displayed on a 
web browser address bar, and it is extracted using four different 
methods (Fatt et al., 2014). The plans include a path to the favi-
con, reference link to the image, alternative attribute link to the 
                                                          
3 TD–IDF, is short for term frequency–inverse document frequency, is a 
numerical statistic that is intended to reflect how important a word is 
picture and an Apple-touch-icon employed by a web server to dis-
play the favicon on a browser. These paths are pasted into the 
Google search-by-image API, and it returns a list of websites re-
lated to the favicon. Hence, they use four different heuristics in 
their method to classify a suspicious site based on the search re-
sults. The result verifies the legitimacy of the site according to the 
page ranking. The first four on the page ranking list are 
considered to be original sites rather than phishing websites be-
cause they have a higher page ranking. They use 1,000 web pages 
to verify the effectiveness of their approach. The result shows 
that the method achieves 97.2% true positives and 2.8% false 
positives. The process has excellent precision but depends solely 
on the favicon for its analysis. The favicon of a legitimate website 
could be copied and used on a fake Internet site, which could re-
sult in high correct positive prediction. The solution is a bit 
reliable but may reduce accuracy, because if a website does not 
have a favicon, their method will regard it as a phishing site. 
However, there are some limitations to the technique, which 
could be detrimental as phishing activities evolve, so this method 
could achieve a better result if combined with other phishing de-
tection features, such as text and frame structure. 
2.4 Heuristic based approaches: 
Xiang et al. (2011) propose a web browser toolbar that uses a TF-
IDF 3  algorithm with another website heuristic feature for 
detecting phishing. They evaluate their content-based approach, 
called CANTINA, which makes use of TD-IDF for identifying 
phishing sites. Their results show a 97% correct positive rate and 
3% false positive rate. However, the approach was unable to 
distinguish between spam and phishing URLs. 
   Equally, Zhang and Yuan (2013) implement phishing detection 
through a feed-forward neural network by incorporating some 
essential features of the email structure and external link. They 
argue that the neural network is excellent in detecting phishing 
email and only misclassifies a small amount of non-phishing 
emails (Zhang and Yuan, 2013). However, their results fail to 
achieve a high accuracy rate. In their work, they write a script to 
to a document in a collection or corpus. It is often used as a weighting 
factor in information retrieval and text mining. 
extract text features from the body of emails and generate a fea-
ture vector set together with the best value into one text file. The 
best benefit from these properties is normalised before applying 
a machine learning algorithm. A total of 4,202 legitimate emails 
and 4,560 phishing emails are used in their study. Their imple-
mentation of a multilayer feed-forward neural network is in Java, 
which provides a framework to conveniently construct neural 
networks and perform training and testing of the dataset. They 
achieve 95% true positive classification, which implies that the 
neural network is excellent at detecting phishing emails with only 
a small amount of misclassification of non-phishing emails. Their 
implementation is improved method that gives a clear result with 
an explanation of the classification while comparing with other 
machine learning algorithms.    
Lastly, Shekokar et al. (2015) also propose a solution for the de-
tection and prevention of phishing that involves web page simi-
larity and URL-based discovery. They use the LinkGuard4 algo-
rithm to analyse the extracted URL from which the website is 
directed and the virtual URL that is seen by the user. If phishing is 
not detected in the URL-based detection approach, the algorithm 
then proceeds to visual similarity-based detection (Shekokar et 
al., 2015). Unfortunately, their test result is not robust due to the 
low number of websites used in their test experiment, so there is 
a need to conduct a comprehensive analysis to improve precision. 
2.5 Why use an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system? 
The ANFIS has been used for decades in the engineering sciences 
to embed expert input into a computer model for a broad range 
of applications. It offers a capable alternative for determining op-
erational risk. The integrated of the neural network and fuzzy in-
ference systems formulated into the synchronised neuro-fuzzy al-
gorithm. This algorithm loads its essential component in rule-
based and performs fuzzy reasoning to deduce overall output 
value (Abraham, 2005). The ANFIS is perhaps the first integrated 
neuro-fuzzy model, and its typical architecture illustrated in Fig. 
3. There are two types of fuzzy inference system models: the 
Mamdani and the Sugeno models (Karaboga and Kaya, 2016). 
These fuzzy inference systems have two inputs and one output. 
                                                          
4 LinkGuard algorithm [Online] Available at: < 
http://www.ijafrc.org/Volume3/issue34/6.pdf > [Accessed 20 October 
2016] 
Mamdani’s neuro-fuzzy system uses a supervised learning 
technique, back-propagation learning, to acquire the parameters 
of the membership functions (Abraham, 2005).  
   To the best of our knowledge, none of the published literature 
has used text, frame and image feature together to detect 
phishing websites automatically in real time. Therefore, there is 
room for improvement of several components, such as text fea-
ture, frame and image feature extraction. The combination of 
these three sets of elements should enhance detection and im-
prove security for users when carrying out transactions on the In-
ternet. Hence, our study intends to develop a robust algorithm to 
address the alarming rate of a phishing attack and provide a 
comprehensive solution.  
The Table 1 below present list of phishing plugin, the indicative of 
techniques they with their effectiveness and service. Each of the 
plugins was developed for a specific browser, and not all are built 
for a cross-platform for the application. That has shown some 
weakness in the build has end user has to choose a browser that 
he is not used to when accessing contentment on the Internet.  
Table 2, also shows the type of features each browser in Table 1 
uses for their phishing detection. Column 1, which represent the 
list of phishing plugin in Table 2 below. The rest of the column 
illustrates the type of features each plugin is using in their detec-
tion model. As indicated in the table, the majority of the plugin 
uses text and heuristic approach in their scheme. The heuristic-
based anti-phishing technique uses website features such as text 
and frame content for its phishing detection analysis with the aim 
of creating a robust classification model (Lee and Park, 2016). 
Other uses blacklist/whitelist approach that is like the use of sig-
natures in antivirus that maintains a blacklist of the site that 
contains malicious content. Blacklisting is reactive and can be 
evaded by rapid recycling blocked phishing web page. However, 
in our solution, all the features and techniques listed in Table 1 
will be exploring to develop the phishing detection and protec-
tion scheme. As this has not been used together as a single solu-
tion in any of the previous approaches and this is the strength of 
plugin development.  
Table 1 
List of Anti-Phishing Plugin and their effectiveness 
Plugin for Phishing Features & Techniques Browser Effectiveness % Service Type 
GoldPhish Heuristics & Features-based IE 98 Free  
Cloudmark Heuristics  IE 94 Free  
Microsoft SmartScreen blacklist and whitelist IE 95.9 Free  
Netcraft (Customise) blacklist and whitelist Chrome; Firefox 90 Free  
SpoofGaurd Heuristics & Features-based   IE 91 Free  
Phishdentity Google search-by-image API IE 97.2 Research 
PhisTackle Heuristics & Features-based IE 91.3 Research 
PhishGuard Heuristics Firefox 94 Research 
PhishIdentifier Heuristics Firefox 92 Research 
PhishTester Heuristics & Features-based IE 97.1 Research 
CANTINA+ Heuristics & Features-based IE 98.06 Research 
PhishAri Features-based Chrome 92.52 Research 
PhishShield Heuristics & Features-based Chrome 96.57 Research 
PhishNet blacklist Chrome 95.0 Research 
PhishDef Heuristics & Features-based Chrome 97 Research  
Google safe browsing blacklist  Chrome; Firefox 93.3 Free  
PhishZoo Heuristics Chrome 96.10 Research 
Seclayer Heuristics & Features-based IE; Chrome 91 Free  
IPDPS Heuristics, Features-based & image IE; Chrome; Firefox 98.55 Research 
Table 2 
Techniques and feature for phishing detection 
Phishing Plugin  Techniques/Features 
 AI Frame Heuristic  Image Text Whitelist & Blacklist 
GoldPhish   √ √ √  
Cloudmark   √  √  
Microsoft SmartScreen     √ √ 
Netcraft (Customise)      √ 
SpoofGaurd   √  √  
Phishdentity   √ √ √  
PhisTackle    √ √  
PhishGuard   √  √  
PhishIdentifier   √  √  
PhishTester   √  √  
CANTINA+   √  √  
PhishAri     √  
PhishShield   √  √  
PhishNet      √ 
PhishDef   √    
Google safe browsing      √ 
PhishZoo   √  √  
Seclayer   √    
IPDPS √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 3. The proposed intelligent phishing detection and 
protection scheme 
Here, we introduce the proposed intelligent phishing detection 
and protection system (IPDPS). We also look at the different 
issues that arise in detecting phishing websites. This section 
covers phishing detection implementation using sets of the 
dataset, the essential characteristics and features of phishing 
website extraction techniques.  
3.1 The main component of intelligent phishing detection 
and protection scheme  
Developing with the anti-phishing methods, phishers use various 
phishing methods and more complex and hard-to-detect 
approaches. The most straightforward way for a phisher to 
swindle people is to make the phishing web page similar to their 
target. However, many distinctive and features can distinguish 
the original legitimate website from the clone phishing website 
like the spelling error, image alteration, long URL address and 
abnormal DNS records. The full list is revealed in Table 3 which is 
used later in our analysis and classification study. If an attacker 
clones a legitimate website as a whole or designed to look 
similar as they usually do in most attacks in recent times, 
our approach is that similar looking phishing web page con-
tent is not left for the users to check for the indicator or the 
authenticity attentively, but can detect by automated 
methods. Our approach is based on website phishing detec-
tion using the features of the site, content and their appear-
ance. These properties are stored in a local database (Excel 
table) as a knowledge model and first compared with the 
newly loaded site at the time of loading against the danger-
ous web page offline. After the comparison was unable to 
detect the similarity, then the critical approach to compare 
the legitimate and fake using the features of the website 
with machine learning for an intelligent decision. The critical 
contribution of our approach includes: 
The method that depends solely on websites’ content to detect 
similar phishing site. It can discover newly phishing website that 
is not yet blacklisted and targeted against unsuspected users. We 
explore dissolute, online detection using both the HTML and URL 
content in the properties of a website. Our method can detect 
98.55% of current phishing sites, with 1.45% false positives. We 
as well study vision techniques to identify phishing website more 
vigorously. This technique requires both scene analysis and im-
ages matching. Our solution explores the matching problem, 
which is sufficient to identify new phishing sites. Using the Scale-
invariant feature transform (SIFT) image matching algorithm, the 
approach can identify 97.2% of phishing sites with a false positive 
rate of 2.8%. This method can be used offline by an application 
for more quickly discover phishing websites. 
Hence, various experiments are conducted to gather and analyse 
phishing factors with relevant rules. The main advantage offered 
by the ANFIS model is the use of linguistic variables to identify 
phishing features in use for the building of our intelligent phishing 
website detection model. The overall outcome of this study is a 
practical plug-in phishing toolbar implementation with appropri-
ate testing and validation.   
   The model that most frequently used with the ANFIS is the 
Sugeno fuzzy model. The Sugeno model is a zero-order model. 
This model will be employed in this research experiment because 
it is the only one that can be implemented with the ANFIS, it has 
differentiable functions that can learn the fuzzy primary system 
from data and it can be easily understood (Abraham, 2005). The 
detailed features of each layer of the zero-order Sugeno fuzzy in-
ference system with inputs x and y and two rules are as follows: 
 IF 𝑥1  𝑖𝑠 𝐴1  
AND   𝑥2 𝑖𝑠 𝐴2 
……. 
AND     𝑥𝑚  𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑚 
THEN    𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . 𝑥𝑚) 
where 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . 𝑥𝑚  are input variables; 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … . . 𝐴𝑚 are fuzzy 
sets, and y is either a constant or a linear function of the input 
variables. However, if y is constant, the zero-order Sugeno fuzzy 
model which the resulting of rule-based is specified could be ob-
tained by singleton (Barraclough et al., 2013).  
The ANFIS is a hybrid learning algorithm that can be used to tune 
the parameters of a Sugeno-type fuzzy inference system. The al-
gorithm uses a combination of the least-squares and back-
propagation gradient descent methods to model a training da-
taset. Hybrid features are used because they can represent phish-
ing attack techniques and strategies. These features are used as 
training and testing input data for the neuro-fuzzy inference sys-
tem so that it can generate fuzzy IF…. THEN rules to differentiate 
between legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites. 
The structure of the intelligent fuzzy inference system has five 
function layers used in making the decision are as follows: 
 
a) Input layer  
Each node in this layer is assigned parameter, which 
includes three membership functions. The neurones in 
this layer quickly transmit visible crisp indications 
straight to the next tier (Kim and Kasabov, 1999). The 
equation (1) below shows the measure in which this is 
done where 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  (i = 1, 2, …. nth) is the parameter 
set, 𝜇𝐴(𝑥)  is the membership function of fuzzy seta   𝐴𝑖  
and X is the input. As the value of the parameter change, 
the shape of the bell-shaped function varies (Fig. 1)  and 
is referred to as premise parameters (Cruz and 
Mestrado, 2009)   
𝜇𝐴(𝑥) =
1
1+|
𝑥−𝑐𝑖
𝑎𝑖
|2𝑏𝑖
     (1) 
b) Fuzzification layer 
A node in this layer acts as a membership function to 
represent the terms of the respective linguistic label 
such as phishing, suspicious and legitimate it assigns a 
value for each key phishing feature indicator (Dariane 
and Azimi, 2016). The valid range of the inputs (X, Y) 
considered that divided into the fuzzy set. The output 
value in the input layer is fed into this layer, and Gauss-
ian membership functions are used with two parame-
ters, variance and mean. Also  𝜇𝐴𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇𝐵𝑖  is the grade 
of the fuzzy sets. The output function of this node is the 
product to which the input belongs and the given mem-
bership function.  
    𝑂𝑖
2 = 𝑤𝑖 = 𝜇𝐴𝑖(𝑥) ∙  𝜇𝐵𝑖(𝑦),    𝑖 = 1,2    (2) 
where A and B are the input parameters used in the 
equation. Every node in this layer is a fixed node, whose 
output is the product of all the incoming signals. Each 
node’s output represents the firing strength of a rule 
(Cruz and Mestrado, 2009). The output is used to deter-
mine the number of rules in next layer. A sample of rule-
based functionality presented in Table 3.  
c) Rule generation layer  
Every node in this layer is a fixed node labelled N. The 
𝑖𝑡ℎ node calculates the ratio of the 𝑖𝑡ℎrule firing strength 
to the sum of all rules' firing strengths. That done by a 
rule-based layer that consists of IF…THEN statements 
that are related to phishing site opportunities at differ-
ent levels that get input 𝑤𝑖  from the individual fuzzifica-
tion 𝑖𝑡ℎ nodes and calculate the strength of the rule it 
represents (Karaboga and Kaya, 2016). 
 
𝑂𝑖
3 = 𝑤𝑖 =  
𝑤𝑖
𝑤1+𝑤2
,   𝑖 = 1,2,  𝑤𝑖  = input  (3) 
 
The output of this layer is called normalised firing 
strengths. 
d) Normalisation layer  
This layer is where normalisation occurs. All the 
neurones in this layer are connected to an individual 
normalisation neurone, as illustrated in Fig.1. The output 
neurone from the rule-based layer is fed into this layer 
and normalise firing strength is resolved. The power of 
the normalised firing neurone is the percentage of the 
firing strength as instructed and the sum of the firing 
force of every rule (Barraclough et al., 2013). 
 
𝑂𝑖
4 = 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑥 + 𝑞𝑖𝑦 + 𝑟𝑖),  (4) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖  is the normalised firing strength from layer 3 
and {𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖}  are the parameters settings, which are 
referred to as essential parameters (Cruz and Mestrado, 
2009) 
e) Defuzzification layer  
This layer is where defuzzification occurs. The neurone 
combines the sum of all the output neurones and 
produces the ANFIS output as shown in Fig.1. The single 
node in this layer calculates the total output as the sum-
mation of the contribution from each rule. The input for 
the defuzzification process is the aggregate output of 
fuzzy set, and a result is a number. The output of the 
phishing web page and risk rate is defined in fuzzy sets 
as legitimate, suspicious, phishing. The output set is then 
defuzzified to arrive at a scalar value.     
𝑂1
5 = 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑖 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖
     (5) 
Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
Input Fuzzification Rule layer Normalization Defuzzification 
 
Fig. 1: Structure of intelligent phishing detection fuzzy inference 
system (Barraclough et al., 2013) 
   The proposed approach uses the ANFIS with hybrid feature in-
puts to detect phishing websites for online transactions together 
with a knowledge model (Fig. 2) to maximise the accuracy, reduce 
the false positives and improve the operation time. The overall 
intelligent phishing detection block structure is presented in Fig. 
2 below. The concept behind the above Fig. 2 involves integrating 
the extracted features in websites to predict phishing activities, 
using a web browser plug-in. The phishing classification steps, 
consisting of the image, frame and text features, the machine 
learning, and classification will use the ANFIS as it applied in the 
initial stage. 
   The output is determined by the classifier, in the phishing de-
tection stage which predicts if the web page is suspicious, legiti-
mate or phishing. The knowledge model and plug-in development 
will be developed at a later stage. The phishing detection block 
diagram in Fig. 2 is explained further by Fig. 3, which illustrates 
the process of acquiring the website features and feeding them 
into the fuzzy inference system for training and testing purposes; 
then the fuzzy IF…THEN rules are applied to distinguish the legit-
imate, suspicious and phishing websites accurately in real time at 
the output step.  
   Fig. 4 presents the conceptual system design and the 
classification of phishing website using text, image and frame fea-
tures based on web page properties. A web browser plug-in will 
be developed using the classification algorithm, which would run 
in the background of the Internet browser and check all websites 
requests to distinguish between legitimate, suspicious and phish-
ing sites. 
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Fig. 2: Conceptual diagram of smart phishing detection system 
based on image text and frame fusion 
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Fig. 3: Diagram of intelligent phishing fuzzy inference system 
structure 
      Fig. 4 shows the system structure is composed of five compo-
nents: website analysis and feature extraction, intelligent system, 
knowledge model, knowledge sources and output process  
   The plug-in uses the ANFIS IF…THEN rule and the features from 
three sets of web page properties that combine the significant el-
ements for plug-in development in such a way to detect phishing 
and legitimate sites accurately in real time. If a phishing website 
is detected, a sound alarm is generated to alert the user. As well-
established that subjective judgment of perceived urgency with 
reaction time (Suied et al., 2008). If the site is suspicious, a red 
colour status with a text-based risk explanation is made to inform 
the user. Because red is associated with the danger or failure in 
achievement contexts and evokes avoidance motivation (Elliot et 
al., 2007). In a situation where the rule violated, a warning is gen-
erated to alert the user, that is a proportion of its warnings 
genuinely indicate the condition to be avoided (Getty et al., 
1995). However, if the information is less severe, a green colour 
status is made, and the user can continue, but if it is highly likely 
that sensitive information was stolen. Then the process is 
automatically stopped, which prevents the user’s personal 
information from being acquired by the fake website, as 
illustrated in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4: Process diagram of intelligent phishing detection and pro-
tection scheme  
4. Features selection and detection criteria analysis 
In this study, reviewing different phishing investigations, research 
papers, conducting a separate phishing experimental case study 
give us more insight into the selection of the feature used for our 
phishing classification. Given this, we can extract 35 elements and 
factors which characterise the signature of any phishing website 
incident. These datasets divided into seven criteria that are 
distributed into three layers, depending on the attack type. The 
most popular feature selection methods in the literature are Chi-
Square (x2) and information gain. Chi-Square is the commonly 
used method and adopted in this study; evaluated features are 
by computing Chi-Square statistics on classes (Gaunt, 2016). The 
information gain technique is also used in feature selection, 
which decreases the size of features by calculating the value of 
each attribute and ranking them. In other words, information 
gain selects elements through scores (Zeng et al., 2016). In this 
approach, a subset of initially chosen features is only used for 
testing and training the classifier (Abunadi et al., 2013). 
   Feature extraction usually converts the original feature space 
into a more compact space. However, the original features are 
retained and transformed into a new reduced space with only a 
few representative sets (Zareapoor and Seeja, 2015). This ap-
proach mainly uses principal component analysis (PCA) and latent 
semantic analysis (LSA). Principal component analysis reduces the 
dimension of the data by transforming the actual attribute space 
into a smaller one (Vidal et al., 2016). That could achieve by con-
verting the real variables 𝑌 = [y1, y2, … , yn] (where n is ntan h 
number of actual variables) into new variables, 𝑇 =
[t1, t2, … , tp] (where p is an nth number of the new set of varia-
bles). The LSA technique is a novel-based method of text classifi-
cation. The approach analyses the relationship between a con-
cept and term contained in unstructured data, and it has the 
ability to correlate semantically related value that are latent in 
nature (Marcolin and Becker, 2016). These processes are used to 
convert the hybrid features into data that can be used to train 
and test our model. 
4.1 How features are chosen 
Selecting phishing features required cautious reflexion. The use 
of primary and secondary sources enables features extraction 
based on text, image and frame as follows: Specifically, on text-
based elements consist of 22 extracted components, which are 
selected based on the effectiveness in detecting phishing and re-
duction in feature redundancy by exploring document and jour-
nal paper. Equally, frame-based features consist of 8 features 
extracted by studying several legitimate, suspicious and phishing 
websites (PhishTank, 2017). Likewise, image-based features have 
5 features which were gathered by observing the image of both 
legal and phishing websites  (Abunadi et al., 2013). That makes 
the overall total of 35 features also known as data used to test 
our model. 
Table 3: Hybrid features  
Text Features Approach  
Search index 
Page ranking 
This feature was used to check the importance of the web page by counting the number of qual-
ity links to a page to determine the relevance of the site on the Internet. 
Google index 
This feature was used to compare if the URL of the website included in the Google index matched 
the one submitted to google index. 
Website traffic This feature is used to measure the amount of data sent and received by a visitor to a website. 
Statistical-report 
This feature is also used for the usage of the website such as the number of queries and the web-
site availabilities. However, a new website may fail this check; some other features are used to 
ascertain the legitimacy of a website. 
Security & encryption 
Long URL 
This feature was used to check the length of URL to determine if the original website has the cor-
respondent URL. 
Using the IP address 
This feature was used to check the URL if it contains IP address as most phishers use this to de-
ceive the unsuspected user. 
Abnormal URL 
This feature will check the URL against abnormality in the resources locator against the infor-
mation store in WHOIS database for the legitimate website. 
Abnormal request 
This feature checks if there is a request from an external object within the web page such as im-
age or video loaded from another domain. 
Abnormal Anchor 
This feature checks if their anchor element is like a tag <a> from an external link. This feature is 
treated as the request URL. 
Web address bar 
Adding prefix or suffix 
This feature is used to check if dash symbol that is rarely used in a valid URLs. Phishers tend to 
add suffix or prefix to separate by (-) to the domain name to made users feel that they are dealing 
with the legitimate web page. These are checked in the URL with our approach. 
URL is having “@” symbol 
This feature is used to check for the @ symbol in the URL as it leads the browser to ignore every-
thing preceding the @ symbol 
Using URL shortening services 
This features check for considerably smaller URL length and still leads to the acquired web page. 
These are achieved by using https redirect on a domain name that is short. 
Some links are pointing to a 
page 
This feature checks the number of links that are pointing to the web page. 
Using non-standard port 
This feature is useful as it checks for validating if a service such as https is up or down. If all ports 
are open, phishers can run almost any service they want.  As a result, user information is 
threatened. 
Domain identity 
Age of the domain 
This feature is used to extract the information from WHOIS database and compare with infor-
mation of a phishing site. Most phishing websites live for a short period. 
DNS record 
This feature was used to check the identity of the domain in WHOIS database for the records. 
However, If the DNS record is not found or empty, the website is then classified as a phishing web 
page. 
Domain registration length This use of this feature is to check how the site is registered. Since phishing websites live for a 
short period, we believe that trustworthy domains are usually paid for several years in advance. 
Source code Javascript 
Redirect using “//” 
This feature was used to check the existence of // within the URL path, which means that the user 
will be redirected to another website. 
Submitting information to email 
This feature was used to check if a website redirected user’s information to a personal email, in-
stead of a server to process. 
https 
This feature is used to check the existence of secure communication and if the issuer is trusted 
and how long, the certificate is issued. 
 
Frame Features Approach 
Iframe redirection 
This feature is used to check the HTML tag used to display additional web pages in the current 
website. A phisher will take advantage of it by making the tag invisible without a frame border. 
Disabling right click 
This feature is used to check if the right-click function is disabled using the JavaScript so that us-
ers cannot save or view the web page’s source code. 
Using pop-up window 
This feature is used to check if users were asked to submit their personal information through a 
pop-up window, which is unusual to find in a legitimate website. 
Server form handler (SHF) 
This feature is used to check if the domain name in server form handler is different from the do-
main name of the web page 
Website forwarding 
This feature is used to check how many times a website has a redirect, a legitimate site does one 
time, while phishing site repeats this more than four times. 
The link in Script & Meta 
This feature is used to check that the tag on the website is linked to the same domain of the web 
page. 
Layout similarity This feature is used to check the percentage of the layout similarity of the web page. 
Style similarity This feature is used to check the percentage of the style similarity of the web page. 
 
Image Features Approach 
Favicon 
This feature is used to check the icon associated with a particular web page and check if the icon 
is loaded from a domain other than that is shown in the address bar. 
Image size This feature is used to check the size of the images on the website 
Alternative text This feature is used to check with some level percentage if alternative text is used on the website 
Mouse over This feature is used to check if JavaScript is used to show a fake URL in the status bar to users. 
Login form This feature is used to check if there is an obstructive login form on the website 
4.2  System detection criteria  
The selection of phishing features requires careful deliberation. 
The use of primary and secondary sources for feature extraction 
based on images, frames and text are described below.  
   This section presents a reasonable phishing detection rate per-
formed based on seven criteria: Search index, URL content, web 
address bar, image identity, domain identity, source code & 
javascript and page style & layout identity, as shown in Fig. 5. The 
Fig. 5 also shows that there are different number of components 
for each criterion. The search index has four elements, and URL 
content has six parts, while there are five elements for the web 
address bar and image identity, four elements for domain 
identity, three features for source code & javascript, and eight for 
page style & layout identity. Therefore, there are 35 critical com-
ponents in total. The elements are selected as the best for the 
detection of phishing and improve the time of discovery too. The 
proposed intelligent phishing detection scheme has three layers, 
as illustrated in Fig. 5. The first layer contains only the text iden-
tity component with the search index criterion with a weight 
equal to 0.2, while the URL content criterion is assigned a weight 
equal to 0.3 for it essential, as a user follow this link to their 
vulnerable site. The web address bar, image identity, domain con-
tent, page style & layout and source code & JavaScript each have 
a weight equal to 0.1. 
  The seven criteria have been prioritised according to their im-
portance using weights to rate them as concluded from a case 
study, website phishing experiments, Anti-phishing tools analysis, 
web survey, phishing quizzes, phishing expert feedback and de-
tailed questionnaire. Various parameter values were used for the 
most efficient detection approach, but below parameter values 
provide the best result in our model.  
Text crisp is represented as follows: 
𝑑1= URL Content 
𝑑2= Search index 
𝑑3= Security & encryption 
𝑑4 = Domain identity 
𝑑5 = Source code & JavaScript 
The Frame crisp is represented as follows: 
𝑔1= Page style & Layout identity 
The Image crisp is represented as follows: 
ℎ1= Image identity  
The intelligent phishing detection rating 𝑍1 weight parameters is 
calculated as: 
𝑧1 = (0.3 ∗ 𝑑1) + (0.2 ∗ 𝑑2) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑3) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑4) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑5) +
(0.1 ∗ 𝑔1) + (0.1 ∗ ℎ1)                                                                         (6) 
    However, to use the right phishing features, it is also essential 
to take into consideration that phishing strategies and techniques 
change with time. The number of features that could be used for 
modelling can vary. There are some challenges attached to phish-
ing websites post-classification. The most challenging concerns 
the phishing website material and date as a form of information, 
which has the net effect of increasing the false negative rate. The 
age of the dataset is the most substantial problem primarily 
regarding the phishing quantity. Some phishing websites are 
short-lived, sometimes lasting only 48 hours (Barraclough et al., 
2013). 
4.2 Dataset  
Two existing independent datasets were used to test the applica-
tion: The University of California Irvine, Rami et al., (2015a) and 
the University of Huddersfield, Rami et al., (2015b).  
   The datasets from University of California Irvine was collected 
in March 2015, has thirty attributes, for text-based features and 
frame-based features with a total of approximately 2,456 web-
sites hits and total number 11,056 datasets. The elements are as-
signed weights, the value of 1 been legitimate, suspicious is assign 
0, and phishing is assigned -1. Also, datasets from the University 
of Huddersfield (Rami et al., 2015b) is the same group of the 
researcher that donate to University of California. However, a 
different set of data that is an update in July 2015, it has the same 
thirty attribute comprises of approximately 2,700 datasets with 
the equal weights (-1, 0, 1) assign to the features.  
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Fig. 5: The overall structure of ANFIS whole system for evaluat-
ing phishing websites 
   Also, an offline selection of the image dataset was also 
collected using (SIFT) image matching to manage elements 
for image size, noise and illumination; these features were 
used to identify the object when attempting to locate the 
image in testing that contained many another object. These 
features are extracted and sore as dataset which used for 
training and testing. The phishing website data was 
collected from PhishTank and Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(APWG), between April to October 2017. 
5. Experimental procedures 
The goal of this study was to gather information about the ap-
proaches employed by hackers and to articulate theory about cat-
egorising and labelling all the different phishing website attack 
techniques. A dataset Rami et al. (2015) was selected containing 
features relating to the various methods that have been used for 
thoroughly investigating phishing attacks and how the use of 
these technologies has changed over time. In compiling the data, 
we found some exciting techniques that depend on the aware-
ness that most users do not know how to check the security of 
sites that ask for sensitive data, which makes it difficult for users 
to see the difference between real security and impersonated se-
curity properties. Some findings also show that even sophisti-
cated users often deceived by visual deception attacks (Aburrous 
et al., 2010). 
   A primary aim of the experiment was to improve the detection 
accuracy and robustness of the system while at the same time 
reducing scrutiny time. Various methods in the literature could 
be used for training fuzzy models, including 2-fold, 5-fold and 10-
fold cross-validation. In this study, all the different folds of cross-
validation (Barraclough et al., 2013) were employed to train and 
test the accuracy and robustness of the proposed model. The re-
sult showed that the 5-fold cross-validation method produced the 
best result and was due to its effectiveness on existing datasets. 
During training, the algorithm learns and extracts features from 
the data file, reads them and uses them to create fuzzy rules.  
   A total of 8,355 Rami et al., (2015a) and 2,500 Rami et al., 
(2015b) with some 2,145-manual selection from PhishTank da-
tasets were used in our classification implementation, and the 
data divided into five for training and a testing dataset. The over-
all dataset consisted of 4,898 phishing websites, 1,945 suspicious 
sites and 6,157 legitimate websites.  
   The practical aspect of this study lay in its utilisation of three 
different conventional classification algorithms (SVM, K-NN and 
ANFIS). The experimental result is presented in chart form in 
Chart. 1. The choice of classification method is based on the dif-
ferent strategies used to learn the rules from the datasets 
(Barraclough et al., 2013). The ANFIS uses linguistic terms and is 
represented by only one fuzzy set. The ANFIS does not provide 
the means to apply value that restrict the type of modification 
applied to membership functions, and it compared with a radial 
basis function network. 
   The SVM uses a clustering algorithm that provides a supervised 
learning model with an associated learning algorithm that 
analyses the data classification and performs regression analysis. 
The ANFIS approach is an improvement on the SVM, and it can 
efficiently deliver nonlinear classification using a kernel trick, 
implicitly mapping inputs into a high-dimensional feature space 
(Huang et al., 2012). K-NN is an instance-based algorithm that 
functions only by storing all available cases and classify new 
instances based on similarity measures, and all computation is 
deferred until classification is derived. The K-NN algorithm is 
among the simplest of all machine algorithms.  
   The proposed intelligent phishing detection and protection 
scheme was implemented in MATLAB Version: 9.1 using the AN-
FIS designer toolbox and classification learner toolbox for the ex-
periment. The parameters in the neuro-fuzzy design toolbox were 
set to epoch 10, the error rate was set to 0, the optimisation 
method was established to hybrid (Fig. 6), and 5-fold cross-vali-
dation was used due to its effectiveness on existing datasets.  
   The input parameter was also assigned and included three 
membership functions. The generalised bell-shaped membership 
function was chosen for various ranges on the X-axis and Y-axis 
(Fig.1). Improving the model’s effectiveness and overcome the 
problems of operational time and high false positives, a hybrid 
method for parameter optimisation was applied with ten epochs 
and zero tolerance error set as illustrated in Fig. 6. The testing 
data and training data was present in the input layer. The neuro-
fuzzy scheme uses the developed rules to differentiate between 
legitimate sites, phishing sites and suspicious sites. 
According to our results, the classification approach is promising. 
The training and classification proved that it is possible to im-
prove the categorisation process. The knowledge model in Fig.2 
will be employed and interfaced with the ANFIS model for active 
phishing detection. The next section presents the training and 
testing results. 
  
 
Fig. 6: Parameter settings for neuro-fuzzy designer training  
6. Training and Testing results with discussion 
Training and testing were performed with the Rami et al., 
(2015a,b) dataset. The five-component input parameter (Table 
1) also includes three membership functions. The process goes 
through inference systems and neural network, with the rules 
developed (Table 3) contain (35) = 243 entries to decide 
through the output layer and this repeated in a way that the da-
taset used once and the error rate recorded.  
   The training was done using supervised learning, with five input 
datasets split into training and endorsement data. The training 
datasets were presented through the input layer in an arbitrary 
order. The process goes through the fuzzy inference system and 
the neural network to decide which is achieved by reasoning 
about the rules that are provided in the rule base until the output 
layer reached.    
   Following training, the testing step followed the same proce-
dure as the training step. The process is repeated for each input 
dataset such that the dataset is used once. The average error rate 
was calculated by summing up the error rate then dividing it by 
the number of data items, and the result was used to measure 
performance. The experimental results were compared with 
those of other classification algorithms, as shown in Chart 1. 
     Table 4 
A sample of rule-based intelligent phishing detection 
 
Recall, accuracy, precision and F-measure can be calculated us-
ing a confusion matrix (Fig. 7). True positive (TP) denotes the 
number of phishing websites correctly classified as phishing, 
false positive (FP) signifies the number of phishing sites classi-
fied wrongly, true negative (TN) represents the number of 
legitimate websites ranked incorrectly, and false negative (FN) 
denotes the number of valid websites classified correctly. The 
matrix calculated as follows: 
Precision =  
𝑇𝑃
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
 
𝐹 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  
2 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
The features used in this experiment consisted of 35 predictors 
features and one response as it was mentioned before; these fea-
tures represent the 22 text features, 8 frame properties and 5 im-
age features. Table 4 through Table 9 present the result for text 
features, frame features; image features and hybrid features, re-
spectively. 
 
Fig. 7: Confusion matrix for phishing dataset 
   In the tables, Column 2 shows the accuracy achieved by using 
the data in the confusion matrix and using the calculation above 
to evaluate the effect. Column 3 shows the recall result, which is 
the proportion of real active cases that were predicted correctly 
as positive. These were measured by dividing TP by the sum of TP 
and FN then transforming that value into a percentage rounded 
to two decimal places. Column 4 displays the precision, which 
denotes the proportion of existent active cases that were 
predicted correctly as actuality. Precision is actually what ma-
chine learning, data mining and information retrieval focus on, 
but it ignored in receiver operation characteristics (ROC) analysis 
(Powers, 2011). Column 5 presents the F-measure result, which 
effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of the pre-
dicted positives and the real positives in proportion to a specific 
agreement in the actual class and the set-Dice coefficient 
(Hripcsak and Rothschild, 2005). The overall training accuracy was 
98.55% for text features. These processes were repeated for the 
frame features with an average training accuracy of 98.06%, 
while image features produced an average efficiency of 97.2% 
and hybrid features had an overall training error of 98.3%.  
Table 5 
Classification of text features 
    Algorithm Accuracy 
% 
Recall 
%  
Precision %  F-measure 
% 
ANFIS 98.55 98.51 98.58 98.54 
KNN 95.50 95.45 95.54 95.49 
SVM Quadratic 94.30 94.29 94.31 94.29 
  
Table 6 
Classification of frame features 
     Algorithm Accuracy 
% 
Recall 
%  
Precision %  F-measure 
% 
ANFIS 98.06 98.02 98.08 98.02 
KNN 59.59 59.20 59.60 59.39 
SVM Quadratic 59.99 59.90 60.10 59.99 
  
Table 7 
Classification of image features 
     Algorithm Accuracy 
% 
Recall 
%  
Precision %  F-measure 
% 
ANFIS 97.20 97.18 97.22 97.18 
KNN 59.20 59.19 59.21 59.20 
SVM Quadratic 63.30 63.29 63.32 63.30 
 
The above table 5 and 6 reflect the fact that the KNN and SVM 
have a low accuracy result and detection time of 52.6 seconds 
due to the dataset used and the features selection compare to 
the ANFIS algorithm. The two algorithms were chosen based on 
the usage in some top journal for classification. 
Table 8 
Classification of hybrid features 
     Algorithm Accuracy % Recall 
%  
Precision 
%  
F-measure 
% 
ANFIS 98.30 98.26 98.31 98.28 
KNN 96.10 96.05 96.14 96.09 
SVM Quadratic 95.20 95.18 95.23 95.20 
 
   The 35-features set was divided into seven separate subsets 
(Table 8) with five elements in each subgroup. Each loaded is the 
subgroup into the input layer in a random order to commence the 
training process, then back-propagation corrected the errors, and 
the error rate recorded. The overall average training accuracy re-
sult for hybrid features was recorded as 98.3% (Table 7) in the 
experiment using 5-fold cross-validation with an average time of 
26.72 seconds. The best relative performance result achieved in 
training and testing compared to the rest of the tested unit is 
98.55% for text-based cross-validation (Table 9). In this paper, 5-
fold cross-validation method was employed to train and test the 
robustness and the accuracy of the proposed model. The 5-fold 
cross-validation method involved dividing the data set into five 
segments. First, doing is the training on segment 1-4, and the 5th 
part used for validation. In the end, the results assembled, and 
the accuracy is determined (Table 8).  
   The results of the proposed scheme were compared with the 
approach proposed in Abdelhamid et al. (2014), which used 
MCAC to produce 94.5% accuracy. It was also compared with the 
method suggested by Barraclough et al. (2013) for phishing de-
tection using neuro-fuzzy which obtained 98.5% accuracy for 
text-only feature detection. However, in our experiment, we 
considered this process, but with the fine-tuning of the features 
arrange together in the same attack pattern for training and test-
ing, and assigning different weight with a reduction in some 
functions by removing the redundant elements used in their 
model. 
 Table 9 
ANFIS 5-fold cross-validation with five features input 
 
Table 10 
ANFIS validation data source result  
 Image Text Frame Hybrid 
2-fold  96.71 93.49 95.44 94.23 
5-fold  97.20 98.55 98.06 98.2 
10-fold 95.03 91.35 95.1 92.53 
 Chart 1 
Experimental result for ANFIS, SVM and KNN classification 
 
 
Our result for phishing detection using text only (see Table 4) rec-
orded a small improvement of 0.05% compared to the above 
conclusion reported by Barraclough et al. (2013). Therefore, we 
conclude that our method (Table 4) has more accuracy when 
using text features than the above methods. Our result using 
image features (see Table 6) only solution recorded 97.2% 
compared to 96.1% result reported by Afroz and Greenstadt 
(2009). However, including more elements such as images and 
frames will further improve the robustness of the system 
proposed in this study. 
7. Conclusion and future work  
This paper presented an intelligent phishing detection and pro-
tection scheme by employing a new approach using the inte-
grated features of images, frames and text of phishing websites. 
An efficient ANFIS algorithm was developed, tested and verified 
for phishing website detection and protection based on the 
schemes proposed in Aburrous et al. (2010) and Barraclough et 
al. (2015).  A set of experiments was performed using 13,000 
available datasets. The approach showed an accuracy of 98.3%, 
which so far, is the best-integrated solutions for web-phishing de-
tection and protection.  
   The primary contribution of this study is the integration of hy-
brid features that have been extracted from text, images and 
frames and that are then used to develop a robust ANFIS solution. 
Future work will include using another algorithm like deep-learn-
ing for phishing web page detection and compare the effective-
ness with the current result. More also, a web browser plug-in 
will be developed based on an efficient algorithm to detect phish-
ing website and thus protect users in real time.  
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